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RANDOM HETEROGENEOUS MATERIALS? THE
ROBERT WILLIAMS BOOK, NEWS FROM FLORIDA, THE
STUFF OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RECONCEIVED
Patrick0. Gudridge*
The Law ofAmerican State Constitutions.Written by Robert F. Williams.
Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 456.
Robert Williams is a distinguished theorist and critic of state
constitutional law - a pioneer and a leader. At first glance, The Law of
American State Constitutions looks to be a grand summing up, a magisterial
synthesis.' But the book is even better: Williams asks hard questions about
likely still the most significant project in state constitutional law across the
past two or three decades-the articulation and elaboration of individual
rights truly alternative to federal constitutional law. Williams closely maps
the several ways that state courts (and sometimes constitution-writers) have
in fact hesitated along the way, expressed reluctance, frequently refusing to
take up the project and in the process collectively putting in place an
awkward jumble of stops and starts.
Professor Williams describes something we already know. It's just short
of thirty-five years since Justice Brennan "taught the band to play,"
*
Vice Dean and Professor, University of Miami School of Law. The first part of this
essay draws heavily on a shorter review of Professor Williams's book that I posted on Jotwell.
See Pat Gudridge, There There? Does State Constitutional Law Exist, JOTWELL (June 21,

2010), http:// conlaw.jotwell.com/?s=robert+williams. I was helped greatly by questions and
comments of participants in a faculty workshop at the University of Miami. I learned much
helpful in the writing of this essay from conversations with my colleagues Charlton Copeland
and Bernard Oxman. Thanks also to Gerald Cope and Frank Shepherd. The first phrase of the
title borrows from SALVATORE TORQUATO, RANDOM HETEROGENEOUS MATERIALS:
MICROSTRUCTURE AND MACROSCOPIC PROPERTIES (2002).
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009); see
I.
Jim Rossi, Assessing the State of State Constitutionalism, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1145
(2011) ("the go-to treatise for the next generation of state constitutional law practitioners and
scholars").
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trumpeting the importance of state constitutional law as an available,
independent resource for rights protection. 2 Academic critiques surfaced in
due course. For example, Paul Kahn deployed an abstractly tuned
skepticism:
To rest state constitutionalism on an idea of the state as an already-defined
historical community, with a text that can be interpreted to reflect the unique
political identity of members of that community, is to try to build a serious
legal doctrine on what may be no more than an anachronism or romantic
myth. Methodologically, the doctrine is backwards: as the subjects of debate
become more difficult, the need to be open to the widest possible sources
3
increases.
James Gardner was blunter:
[S]tate constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting,
and essentially unintelligible pronouncements....
... The central premise of state constitutionalism is that a state constitution
reflects the fundamental values, and ultimately the character, of the people of
the state that adopted it. This premise, however, cannot serve as the
foundation for a workable state constitutional discourse because it is not a
good description of actual state constitutions; it embraces theoretical
inconsistencies that undermine its value as a framework for a coherent
discourse; and it takes an obsolete and potentially
dangerous view of the
4
texture and focus of American national identity.
Rejoinders followed.5 The result, we may think, was a not unfamiliar
academic stalemate-assertion and counter, both persisting.
Williams, participant throughout, now brings the war back home. He
shows just how well entrenched uncertainty has become, how irresolute state
constitutional law appears to be, not only as jurisprudence, but as day to today judicial practice. Federal constitutional understandings often continue to
2.

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights,

90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).

3. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1147, 1160 (1993).
4. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761, 763-64 (1992).

5. E.g., Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments On
Gardner's FailedDiscourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and
Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw, 84 VA. L. REV. 389 (1998).

2010]

WILLIAMS BOOK REVIEW

matter most. His account rings true. Importantly, of course, irresolution
does not mean deferral across the board. In this century, we know, some
judges invoking their state constitutions have proceeded markedly
independent of federal colleagues in the course of recognizing rights
protections for same sex marriage. 6 Longer-term projects in some statesfor example, attention to school funding inequalities in New Jersey7-also
show persistent state constitutional elaborations of rights and limits markedly
distinct from federal preoccupations. Irresolution, however, does mean that
state constitutional law treatments of individual rights-or at least, the
constitutional provisions and judicial opinions that are first materialsdisplay a seemingly random heterogeneity, no relatively uniform or
otherwise well-defined set of commitments or recurring preoccupations,
indeed (because of ubiquitous deferrals to federal law) no strong sense of
regime or identity.
In this essay, I ultimately call attention to an alternate conception of state
constitutional law, federal constitutional law, and their interplay. Federal and
state constitutions may inhabit, as it were, a common field, even if never
only. But it is also the case, I think, that constitutional understandings, as
they emerge federally or in states, are importantly intermittent: often enough
formulations of ideas and vocabularies in response to prompts, to
circumstances pushing against casual or familiar formulations, occasions for
re-sorting ideas and vocabularies. (It is to the extent that this is so, after all,
that federal and state constitutional law distinctively matters.) In these ad
hoc processes, the common field sometimes becomes put to new work,
seized upon and seized from, rearranging prior histories of federal and state
constitutional usages. "[H]ard cases ... make ... law." 8 We should not be

surprised if the common field therefore looks a lot like a jumble or heap,
simply an accumulation of efforts, and that the individual efforts themselves,
the cases or lines or projects-even if they purport to declare visions of a
whole-are most of the time our principal focus. American constitutional
law of whatever sort, in its parts or taken as whole, may not presuppose
anything like a worked out sense of the overall, of an idea of a regime, its
integrity, or its sufficiently autonomous, sufficiently elaborated content.
I begin by sketching topics Robert Williams develops in detail, most
importantly the unease that he maps infiltrating the project of state
E.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 203). As Professor
6.
Rossi notes in his review, Professor Williams, surprisingly, discusses these cases only in
passing. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 1148.
See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, (N.J. 2011); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d
7.
273 (N.J. 1973).
8.
N. Sees. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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constitutional elaboration of individual rights. I move next to a close study of
my own, addressing a sequence of federal and state judicial opinions
considering Florida's statute prohibiting adoption of children by otherwise
eligible, homosexual couples. Initially, the sequence appears to suggest that
Florida constitutional law provided a resource that federal law did not. State
judges took hold of a vocabulary their federal colleagues had not located, a
way to frame scrutiny of the adoption exclusion that made clear the statute's
constitutional invalidity.
It's more complicated, I argue: the Florida effort appropriates (even if
nearly invisibly) constitutional figurings formerly important in federal
constitutional law but now nearly invisible there. This exercise in "taking
over" is not a simple matter. Federal constitutional resources are treated as
though they are themselves the stuff of state law (the question of whether
federal courts today make use of these resources becomes irrelevant).
Appropriation is not a forced, foreign transplanting. We observe a complexly
knit heterogeneity we only sometimes acknowledge to be part of American
constitutional law. The uncertainties inhabiting and inhibiting state
constitutional law-making-brought to light by Robert Williams's
mappings-in context recede, revealing conjunctions that appear to be
fundamental but nonetheless bespoke, keyed importantly to the matter at
hand. In particular, in the instance I study here, I note the apparent role of
the United States Fourteenth Amendment as a presence within Florida law,
as itself part, not an external constraint and also not simply a source of
terminology, but a kind of constitutionalprompt, a recurring call to attention.
I. THE WILLIAMS CHALLENGE

The four chapters in part one of The Law of American Constitutions

depict state constitutions as distinctive, separately identifiable legal
phenomena. Robert Williams briefly characterizes the form, content, quality,
and political resonances typical to state constitutions; sketches pre-federal
history and later developments; and identifies the several constraints that
federal law sets. The four chapters in part three explore the state
constitutional law of separation of powers, highlighting differences as
against federal approaches. The single chapter that Williams marks as part
four addresses interpretive questions, "with a specific focus on those that
arise from the unique nature of state constitutions." 9 The final two chapters
address modern state constitutional revision, noting the differences in

9.

WILLIAMS,

supra note 1, at 311.
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approaches among the states that have taken the matter seriously in the
twentieth century.
None of this would surprise Thomas Cooley, we might think, whose
Constitutional Limitations famously helped shape thinking about state
constitutional law across the latter part of the nineteenth century.' 0 But I
have omitted so far any mention of the second part of Robert Williams's
book: "Rights Guarantees Under State Constitutions: The New Judicial
Federalism." These three chapters show something new-new not only set
against Cooley's treatise, but also vis-Ai-vis Justice Brennan's argument in
1977 urging judges and lawyers to seize state constitutional law in service of
a strong individual rights jurisprudence. Cooley and Brennan might have
disagreed about the specific content of "constitutional limitations.''"" But
both thought that the effort to identify and elaborate "constitutional
limitations" securing individual rights was a primary part of the agenda of
any body of constitutional law. Williams shows that in more recent years,
however, once past the initial "thrill of discovery,"' 2 "backlash' ' 13 triggered
"the long hard task ' 14 of "state and federal constitutional dialogue"15-a
the clear majority of cases,"'16
nicely diplomatic way of noting that "in .
state courts these days refuse to develop independent state constitutional law
of individual rights and instead follow federal law.
This refusal, it appears, expresses itself in three ways. State judges
frame sequencing rules that work to limit the circumstances in which the
question of whether to develop independent state constitutional law of
individual rights may be seen as properly arising.1 7 They develop secondorder criteria for thinking about whether state constitutional law independent
of federal constitutional law is a good idea.18 Or judges (sometimes state
constitutional drafters do this too) affirmatively embrace "lockstepping,"
simply preclude the possibility of deviating from federal understandings of
10. See generally THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION (1972) (reprint of 1868 first edition).

11. Not always, of course: in his torts treatise Cooley outlined, for example, something
very much like the actual malice test that Brennan later put to work in his most famous
opinion. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 217-21 (1st ed. 1880); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376

U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964) (citing post-Cooley 7th edition of Cooley's constitutional treatise).
12. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 119.
13. Id. at 127.
14. Id. at 130.
15. Id. at 131.
16. Id. at 194.
17. See id. at 140-46.
18. See id.at 146-77.
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individual rights. 19 It is all, we might think, a strange combination of
Prufrock ("do I dare to eat a peach"), and Ulysses and the Sirens. Professor
Williams is careful and tactful. He describes the forms of hesitancy in
considerable detail, the variations from state to state, the reactions in the
commentary-in all, he takes it intensely seriously as a mode of thought. But
he also allows himself to note at one point: "It is substance, not form, that
counts most." 20 And it is clear that Williams thinks that the so-called
"criteria" cases verge repeatedly on category error: "At its core, the criteria
approach is based on a notion that interpretation of the [F]ederal Constitution
can somehow authoritatively set the meaning for similar provisions of state
constitutions.,, 21 His discussion of "lockstepping" includes a wonderful
image Williams borrows from former U.S. Supreme Court Justice David
Souter, writing in his state supreme court days: "A state's constitutional
provisions need not, and should not, be reduced
to a 'row of shadows'
' 22
through too much reliance on federal precedent.
State constitutions, we don't doubt, exist. And there is plainly a lot of
state constitutional law, articulated all over the place, sometimes more or less
uniformly across the entire set of constitutions, and sometimes divergently.
It's not clear, however, when or why particular state constitutions become
associated with substantial bodies of constitutional law. Professor Williams
shows that interference with efforts to articulate state constitutional law are
both frequent and at least sometimes inexplicable within state constitutional
terms per se.
Perhaps he looks too closely. We might conceive of the work of
articulating constitutional norms as a project in common, a shared effort
involving federal and state participants alike-Gelpcke v. Dubuque reborn.23
Institutional actors in particular jurisdictions, however, may bring to the
common project their own conceptions of their own limits and modes of
approach, even as each also takes into account-sometimes accepting and
sometimes rejecting-the contributions of other actors. The overall result
could be the pattern that Williams discerns: a series of starts and stops
evident in the work of particular state courts nonetheless contributing to the
overall effort of building constitutional law generally through their
intermittent exercises in elaborating state constitutional law. Viewed as
19. See id. at 193-232.
20. Id. at 144.

21. Id at 170.
22. Id.at 228 (quoting State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added)).
23. See Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 205-07 (1863); James Bradley
Thayer, The Case of Gelpeke v. Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV. 311,317-19 (1891).

WILLIAMS BOOK REVIEW

2010]

simply momentary perturbations in the overall interplay, the cases that
Williams cites appear to be of much less concern. James Gardner and Jim
Rossi sketch a version of this tack at the outset of their important new book:
Different institutional strengths and capacities of the state and national
judiciaries, distinctive local or regional experiences, variations in the
nationwide distribution of public opinion or culturally informed preferences,
and many other kinds of variability can introduce path-dependent
divergences in the development and elaboration of even the most
fundamentally shared constitutional norms. Consequently, the best way to
think about the regime of dual enforcement of constitutional norms is that it
institutionalizes a kind of permanent and highly complex conversation
among many actors, each situated somewhat differently from all the others,
and each therefore approaching the 24project of constitutional elaboration from
a potentially distinct vantage point.
At first glance, it may appear that they propose a way of thinking not too
different from ideas outlined by Paul Kahn nearly two decades earlier:
State constitutional texts are best thought of as multiple efforts to articulate a
common aspiration for constitutional governance.
Of course, different courts can and will reach different conclusions about
the meaning of

. .

. constitutional values.

Agreement is no more to be

expected of courts than of individuals. Conflict over the meaning of
common values, however, does not imply that each community has hold of a
unique or separate constitutional truth.
...Different state understandings of constitutional norms should.., be seen
25
as different insights into a common object of interpretation.
There is in fact a fundamental shift in perspective. Gardner and Rossi
suppose, it seems, that because of "path-dependent divergences,"
"fundamentally shared constitutional norms" do not establish themselves in a
clear cut way, only "permanent and highly complex conversation among
many actors," each "approaching the project of constitutional elaboration
from a potentially distinct vantage point., 26 It is conversation in other
24. James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, Dual Enforcement of ConstitutionalNorms, in, NEW
(2011).
25. Kahn,supranote 3,at 1160, 1161, 1162.
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10
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words, in which participants often talk past each other. The new perspective
treats courts as institutions first and therefore stresses "[d]ifferent
institutional strengths and capacities" and the like. Substantive agreement or
disagreement is really not the point (Gardner and Rossi are agnostics in this
regard).27 Institutional interplay is what we are supposed to see. Thus,
Paul
28
Kahn's "common object" and "common aspiration" become mirages.
This mountain top realism, however, raises disorienting questions of its
own. Path dependency and the like imply points of departure possessed of
some content, some capacity to point out a direction of travel. Even if paths
followed viewed on high, are accidents of a sort, Gardner and Rossi hold that
"actions . . . are better than they would be without the conversation. 29
Presumably, "better" here means better from the perspective of officials
themselves. Where do the norms interior to constitutional law conversation
come from? Are there pure forms as it were, that officials understand
themselves to perceive, thus also perceiving complicating institutional
factors as akin to noise or static? Or are officials thoroughgoing
institutionalists, framing their own courses exclusively or largely within their
sense of the parameters of office? "Paths" may in fact be patternless viewed
externally, but the internal counterpart still seems to requite an account of its
own terms, however chimerical the terms look to be from outside and
above-terms within which judges, lawyers, and critics think and write.
It might be better to proceed precisely oppositely, affirmatively embrace
state constitutional law as "a parochial, state-specific matter." 30 We may be
able to recover-immediately within the constitutional law of particular
states, even if only sometimes-the complexities of particular textual
settings, often-tragic histories, and collections of judicial improvisations. We
might find these accumulations, at least on occasion, to be themselves rich
27. For a penetrating and important discussion precisely associating institutional
differences and alternate perspectives regarding the substantive reach of constitutional law, in
an essay included in Professors Gardner and Rossi's book, see Helen Hershkoff, State
Common Law and the Dual Enforcement of ConstitutionalNorms, in GARDNER & Rossi,
supra note 24, at 151-72.
28. Gardner and Rossi's book includes a very brief sketch by Dean Sager of an account
of the development of substantive propositions in system-level terms assigning an initial
creative role to state constitutional law and a consolidating role for federal law. Lawrence G.
Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life Cycle of Moral Progress, in GARDNER & Rossi, supra
note 24, at 15-24. Professor Gardner's own separate contribution contends-more or less
oppositely-that state constitutional law cannot acquire sufficient content without drawing on
federal law although federal law itself is self-sufficient. James A. Gardner, Why Federalism
and ConstitutionalPositivism Don 't Mix, in GARDNER & Rossi, supra note 24, at 39-59. Both
of these essays warrant closer attention than I can give here.
29. GARDNER & Rossi, supra note 24, at 11.
30. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8.
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enough to sustain strong arguments, to sustain therefore a sufficiently
pointed constitutional law. The threshold superstructures of the sort that
worry Professor Williams might be reconceived, along the way, not as
barriers to formulation of constitutional law but as markers of matters not apt
(for whatever reason) for constitutional development within the given
regime. In some instances, thoroughgoing inquiry into the stuff of state
constitutional law may turn out to implicate and bring to bear federal
constitutional resources. Federal preoccupations are notably put to work as
state law: arrangements inside out or upside down as it were, amalgams
suggestive of originary stresses seized and put to use rather than repressed.
II. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF THE FLORIDA GAY ADOPTION CONTROVERSY

A recent, widely noticed sequence of federal and Florida opinions offers
a glimpse of these possibilities concretely realized.
Deciding Lofton v. Department of Children and Family Services in

January of 2004, a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit upheld, under federal constitutional law, the Florida
statute prohibiting otherwise-qualified homosexual couples from adopting
children. In July of the same year, twelve Circuit judges, splitting evenly,
denied en banc review. 32 Judge Barkett dissented. She stressed the antipathy
to homosexual couples that she took to be fundamental to the statute: "[T]he
classification at issue .. .exudes animus, '3 3 she asserted, undercutting any

claim that the Florida law rested on a constitutionally required rational
basis. 34 Two colleagues joined this part of Barkett's en banc dissenting
opinion. 35 Three others, writing very briefly, thought that the rational-basis
question warranted en banc review, but notably did not draw attention to the
possibility of statutory antipathy.36 Judge Birch (the author of the panel
opinion), specially concurring in the denial of en banc review, contended that
it was enough if there was "an arguably rational basis" 37 for the statutory
exclusion, in this instance supplied by the idea that the challenged statute
aimed at "placing adoptive children in the mainstream of American family
31. Lofton v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 1), 358 F.3d 804 (11 th Cir.
2004).
377 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir.
32. Lofton v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 11),
2004) (en banc).
33. Id. at 1292 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
34. Judge Barkett developed her argument at length. See id.at 1291-1303.
35. Id. at 1290 (Anderson, J.,dissenting). Judge Barkett had also analyzed the case in
substantive due process terms. Id. at 1303-13 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1313 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1276 (Birch, J., concurring).
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life.", 38 Birch conceded that "the actual legislative history" might support
Judge Barkett's finding of animus, but asserted that it was enough 39for
constitutional purposes if "there exists some 'conceivable' rational basis."
In late 2008, however, a Miami-Dade Circuit Court judge concluded that
the statutory exclusion was unconstitutional.4 ° Judge Lederman framed her
analysis as a matter of Florida constitutional law, but also cited federal
decisions prominently, indeed sometimes writing as though she were
following Judge Birch in Lofton:
States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their
legislative judgments. Rather, those challenging the legislative judgment
must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification
is apparently based could not41 reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decision maker.

Lederman nonetheless noted Lofion was decided "nearly five years ago," and
now, given "consensus based on widely accepted results of
respected studies
42
by qualified experts," reconsideration in 2008 was "ripe.,
Judge Lederman reviewed at considerable length an authoritatively
presented and carefully developed record of plaintiff-presented testimony,
only weakly countered by state witnesses, as well as a substantial list of
stipulations showing the parties in agreement on the overall structure of
Florida law and administrative practice (including a policy recognizing
homosexual couples as eligible foster parents), and the notable virtues of the
plaintiffs as would-be parents.43 She concluded in addition that the statutory
exclusion of otherwise-qualifying gay couples as eligible adoptive parents
was inconsistent with a state statutory obligation, explicitly declared, "to
provide all dependent children with a stable and permanent home." 44 "The
Florida Supreme Court recently reestablished the child's right to permanency
doctrine and confirmed that adoption is the highest and preferred form of

38. Id.
39. Id. at 1278-79.
40. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
41. Id. at *27. Judge Lederman also agreed with the original Lofton panel that the
"matter does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class and is thus reviewed under the
rational basis test." Id. (citing Lofion 1, 358 F.3d at 818).
42. Id.
43. Id. at* 1-21.

44. Id.at*21.
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permanency. ' 45 "The exclusion causes some children to be deprived of46 a
permanent placement with a family that is best suited to meet their needs."
Judge Lederman's constitutional inquiry as such was strikingly brief and
matter of fact. Taking up the state's asserted defenses of the exclusion law
one-by-one-stressing the "well established and accepted consensus in the
field that there is no optimal gender combination of parents"-she quickly
declared that the failure "to offer any reasonable, credible evidence" showed
the statute to be "no longer rationally related" to suggested government
concerns. 47 A "public morality" defense failed, in particular, given Florida's
,,48
acknowledgement that "homosexuals may be lawful foster parents.
The Lederman opinion is a persuasive effort within its own terms. But
"its own terms" are not so straightforward. Rational basis inquiries are often
thought to be easy matters for defenders of legislation, requiring little if any
record support, none or not much concern for careful drafting-it is enough
that statutory groupings or exclusions might conceivably serve some proper
legislative purpose. This was, we have already seen, the perspective that
Judge Birch had brought to bear in the federal Lofton case, and the
perspective that Judge Lederman's own formulation of the constitutional test
might have seemed to suggest.
Notably, the Third District Court of Appeal opinion that Judge Cope
released last September took a markedly different tack.49 Cope's opinion
shows little, if any, interest in federal law, relying instead on Florida
Supreme Court opinions to word the relevant test. This is the introductory
formulation:
Under the rational basis test, "a court must uphold a statute if the
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
which is
objective" The classification must be "based on a real difference
50
reasonably related to the subject and purpose of the regulation."

45. Id. at *23.
46. id. at *25.

47. id. at *28.
48. Id. at *29.
49. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. In re Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Judge Salter's concurring opinion emphasized the strength of the family

grouping in the case at hand and subsequent legislative and administrative actions contrary to
the premises of the adoption exclusion. See id. at 96-99 (Salter, J., concurring).
50. Adoption of X.XG., 45 So. 3d at 83 (citations omitted) (quoting Warren v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 2005); State v. Leicht, 402 So. 2d 1153,
1155 (Fla. 1981)) (alterations in original).
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This is the reiteration, placed in the opinion just before the conclusion that
the statutory exclusion is unconstitutional:
In conclusion on the equal protection issue, the legislature is allowed to
make classifications when it enacts statutes. As a general proposition, a
classification will be upheld even if another classification or no classification
might appear more reasonable. The classifications must, however, be based
on a real difference which is reasonably related to the subject and purpose of
the regulation. The reason for the equal51protection clause was to assure that
there would be no second class citizens.
"Real difference" looks to be a test that might make the results of a trial
record relevant and otherwise justify a hard look at both legislative premises
and likely accomplishments-precisely the investigation both Judges
Lederman and Cope undertook.52 The Third District opinion, as we can see,
presents this revised formulation as if it simply explains what "rational
relationship" means within Florida constitutional law, a definition already
established in opinions of the Florida Supreme Court.53
A close look at the cases that Judge Cope mentioned, however, shows a
not quite so fully resolved state of affairs. The opinion in Warren v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. appears to regard its "rational
relationship" standard as looking to what "it was reasonable for the
Legislature to believe"-54-a version of the "conceivable rational basis"
51. Adoption of XX.G., 45 So. 3d at 91 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Leicht, 402 So. 2d at 1155; Osterndorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 545-46
(Fla. 1982)).
52. Judge Cope drew upon the testimony and the stipulations in the circuit court
proceeding and reached conclusions much like those of Judge Lederman concerning the
failure of the state's defense of the statutory exclusion to find sufficient footing in the record.
See Adoption of XXG., 45 So. 3d at 81-82, 87-91, 92-96. He did not address Judge
Lederman's discussion of the statutory right to permanent placement. See id. at 84-85; see also
id. at 83 n.5.
53. The Florida Supreme Court plainly left the door open, however. Judge Cope's
opinion highlights the supreme court's brief per curiam opinion in Cox v. FloridaDepartment
of Health and Rehab. Services, 656 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1995), conclusorily quashing a grant of
summary judgment in favor of HRS in an earlier challenge to the adoption ban because "[a]
more complete record is necessary to determine this issue" - that is, the application of "the
rational-basis standard for equal protection under ... the Florida Constitution." Id. at 903; see
Adoption ofXXG., 45 So. 3d at 83-84. Cox invoked Vildibill v. Johnson, 492 So. 1047 (Fla.
1986), with seemingly at best only weak support for factual investigation: "Appellees have
failed to supply, and this Court has failed to find, any justification or state interest..." id. at
1050. Judge Cope's opinion in Adoption of XX G., thus, is better read not as following from
Cox but as an effort to supply the analysis missing in Cox.
54. Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 2005).
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formula that Judge Birch stated as the federal standard in Lofton H. 55 State
v. Leicht indeed includes the "real difference" wording in its summary of
constitutional criteria, although the Florida Supreme Court thought that the
law at issue there was easily defended and thus the court, not surprisingly,
left the implications of the formula unexplored.56 The supreme court did
point to its 1964 decision in Finlayson v. Conner, which equated "real
difference" and "practical basis," and which undertook what appears to be an
independent if quick common sense assessment of the challenged statute in
upholding it. 57 Finlayson 58
declared that "[n]umerous cases" supported the
"principle," citing a digest.
III. THE SURPRISINGLY FEDERAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE FLORIDA
INQUIRY

The most extended discussion of "real difference" I have found in the
59
recent decisions of the Florida Supreme Court occurs in Bourassa v. State.
In his dissent there, Justice Adkins objected to the majority's refusal to hear
a challenge to inclusion of marijuana in a list of criminally prohibited drugs,
notwithstanding a well-developed record suggesting that marijuana was
plainly different as a matter of fact from the other drugs listed:
Florida and Federal courts have long since agreed a law creating
classifications without a rational basis denies equal protection. The Federal
"rational basis" test has been articulated in a number of ways. For one test,
the Supreme Court has said a statutory discrimination will be upheld if any
state of facts may reasonably be conceived to justify it. As another test, the
court has said a classification must rest upon a difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the law's objective. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412 (1920)....
Florida courts' articulation of the "rational basis" test[,] ... although
varyingly phrased, is most closely analogous to the requirements of Royster
Guano Co. Both tests require more than a hypothetical rational basis for
classification. This court has interpreted the Florida Constitution to require a
"valid and substantial reason for classifications." The requirement has also
55. See Lofton 11, 377 F.3d 1275, 1276, 1277-78 (11 th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Birch, J.,
concurring), quoting Lofton 1, 358 F.3d 804, 817-18 (11 th Cir. 2004) (panel opinion).
56. Leicht, 402 So. 2d at 1154-55.
57. Id. (citing Finlayson v. Conner, 167 So. 2d 569, 571 (Fla. 1964)).

58. Id.
59. 366 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
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been termed one for "reasonable justification," or "a just, fair and practical
basis" for classification "based on a real difference which is reasonably
related to the subject and purpose of the regulation." To determine the
rationality of a law the court must look at the purpose the law serves, the
facts involved, the impact of the6 law upon citizens and the relationship
between the law and these factors. 0
It is indeed easy to glimpse an origin of "real difference" in Royster
Guano. A tax classification controversy, Justice Pitney there associates the
idea that a "ground of difference" must have "a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation" with the idea that a classification cannot
"appear to be altogether illusory., 61 Justice Brandeis dissents, however: "I
can conceive of a reason for differentiating" in the way that the legislation
had and therefore "the classification is not illusory." 62 He seems to
understand "real difference" as simply the opposite of "altogether illusory,"
as a test functionally closer to the now-mainstream "conceivable basis"
federal formula. Royster Guano shows "real- difference" usage as itself
encapsulating the alternative approaches to judicial scrutiny we are also led
to notice via Judge Cope's initial juxtaposition of passages from Warren and
Leicht.
This tension in United States Supreme Court formulations was not
resolved until about mid-way through the twentieth century. In the wellknown case, Railway Express Agency v. New York 63 - putting at issue a New
York City ordinance exempting owner-advertising from an otherwise general
ban on truck advertising-Justice Jackson explicitly rejected the
"conceivable basis" approach: "The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference
that can be pointed out between those bound and those left free. '64 He upheld
the exemption

60. Id.at 14 (Adkins, J.,dissenting) (citations omitted). Among the Florida cases that
Justice Adkins cites, the most apt appears to be State v. Lee, 356 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1978),
framing its own approach in terms borrowed from a 1929 United States Supreme Court
decision, Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1929). See Lee, 356 So.2d at 279. Conway, it
turns out, relies on the same Royster Guano formula invoked in Bourassa by Justice Adkins.
See Conway, 281 U.S. at 160.
61. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
62. Id.at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes agreed with Justice Brandeis. Id.
at 417.
63. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
64. Id.at 115 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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because there is a real difference between doing in self-interest and doing
for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate action from those who act on their
own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be promoted for a
price. "Real" is a matter of usage. Certainly the presence of absence of hire
65
has been the hook by which much highway regulation has been supported."
But Jackson wrote only for himself. Justice Douglas, writing for a majority
of seven,66 followed the "conceivable basis" approach, framing the test
especially emphatically in burden of proof terms:
The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertised
their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in
view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use. It would take a
case.67
degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the
It is the Douglas opinion in Railway Express-and not Jackson's-that sets
Birch
the form for federal equal protection analysis in terms that Judge
in Lofion. 68
would understand as well-settled over a half-century later
Importantly, however, the movement away from the majority approach
in Royster Guano was not straightforward. The most thought-provoking
elaboration of the real difference formula-for present purposes, certainlyhas its beginning in (of all places) Justice Brandeis's dissent in that case, the
dissent that we have already seen is also a locus classicus of the conceivable
basis test. Brandeis states an approach to Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection analysis generally: "[T]he amendment forbids merely inequality
which is the result of clearly arbitrary action and, particularly, of action
attributable to hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes. 69
This summary condenses (and cites) a synthesis framed by Justice Bradley,

65. Id.
66. Justice Rutledge "acquiesce(d] in the Court's opinion and judgment, dubitante on
the question of equal protection of the laws." Id.at I11.
67. Id. at 110 (majority opinion).
68. Justice Jackson, later writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in Walters v. City of
St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954), another tax classification case, began his equal protection
inquiry by insisting that "classification rest on real and not feigned differences," id. at 237, but
immediately juxtaposed that requirement with statements that "the distinction have some
relevance to . . .purpose," id., and not "be wholly arbitrary," id., concluding that "every
presumption in . . . favor" of the challenged classification "is indulged," id at 238
(summarizing Justice Douglas's test more or less).
69. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 418 (1920) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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writing for the Supreme Court in Bell's Gap Railroadvery near the end of
his long judicial career:
All ... regulations ... so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and
general usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature, or the people
of the state in framing their constitution. But clear and hostile
discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially such as are
of an unusual character, unknown to the practice
of our governments, might
70
be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition.
Bradley's targeting of "hostile discriminations against particular persons
and classes" echoes and also generalizes (however mutedly) the concerns
and commitments he associated with the idea of "the equal protection of the
laws" a quarter-century earlier. Set against the backdrop of the Colfax
massacre,71 his circuit opinion in United States v. Cruikshank included this
dramatic declaration:
The war of race, whether it assumes the dimensions of civil strife or
domestic violence, whether carried on in a guerrilla of predatory form, or by
private combinations, or even by private outrage or intimidation, is subject to
the jurisdiction of the government of the United States; and when any
atrocity is committed which may be assigned to this cause it may be
punished by the laws and in the courts of the United States; but any outrages,
atrocities, or conspiracies, whether against the colored race or the white race,
which do not flow from this cause, but spring from the ordinary felonious or
criminal intent which prompts to such unlawful acts, are not within the
jurisdiction of the United States, but within the sole jurisdiction of the states,
unless, indeed, the state, by its laws, denies to any particular race equality of

70. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890). The other two

decisions that Justice Brandeis cites in Royster Guano do not characterize Equal Protection
Clause obligations in terms similar to those used by Justice Bradley. The gist of Bradley's
proposition, however, was not unique to him. Justice Field wrote, for example: "The inhibition
... was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special
subject for discriminating and hostile legislation." Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1888). Field's influential opinion in Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884), however, did not make a similar point. See id. at 31-32.
71. Regarding the events at Colfax, Louisiana, see, LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX
MASSACRE (2008); NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION 3-29 (2006).
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rights, in which case the government of the United States may furnish
manner.72
remedy and redress to the fullest extent and in the most direct

Bell's Gap reads the equal protection guarantee as extending beyond
detrimental racial differentiations, an extension already well-established in
1890, but also implicitly treats the "war of race" as archetype, it is easy to
think, as illustrative of a worrisome antipathy-"civil war," as it were,
pointedly marking the conjunction of "unusual" state law and "hostile
discrimination." Bradley thus also provocatively foreshadows an important
element in present-day federal equal protection law, precisely prefiguring
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer v. Evans,73 famously discerning a
similar conjunction: Romer like Bell's Gap carries forward a Reconstruction
Equal Protection Clause.74
Justice Brandeis returned to the question of the content of equal

protection requirements a few years after Royster Guano in his dissent in
Quaker City Cab Co. v, Pennsylvania,75 again citing Bell 's Gap, but this time
appearing to link Bradley's preoccupations and the "real difference" test:

72. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 714 (C.C.D. La. 1874), aff'd, 92 U.S.
542 (1875). Justice Bradley, we know, avoided actually acting on his statement in the case at
hand-seemingly an especially apt occasion, see, for example, the accounts cited previously.
See supra note 71. Chief Justice Waite's Supreme Court opinion notably included no passage
akin to Bradley's below. On Cruikshank, see generally CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM

(2008).
73. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). "[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected." Id. at 634.
74. 1 do not mean to suggest that there was some single Reconstruction era
understanding of the import of the Fourteenth Amendment. The amendment emerged in a
period of great political controversy that divided the so-called "North" even as the
"North"/"South" polarity also persisted. Nor do I want to suggest that Justice Bradley was in
some sense a defining figure jurisprudentially within the period. But because his own
ambivalence-his own failure of nerve, we might think-is so evident in Cruikshank and in
later cases, strong statements like the general formulation in Cruikshank possess a distinctive
ring of authenticity, as expressive of wider felt apprehensions and commitments Bradley could
not deny, even if he honored them in the breach and not the observance. For challenging
discussion of Cruikshank, in many respects the starting point for much current thinking, see
DIED

ROBER J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 142-51, 174-88 (1st ed.

1985). Pamela

Brandwein means to displace Kaczorowski's

reading. See PAMELA

BRANDWEIN, REHTINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 87-128 (2011).

Notably, neither Professors Brandwein nor Kaczorowski makes much of the passage from
Justice Bradley's opinion that I have quoted above. There is still, I think, more to learn by
engaging Cruikshank.
75. 277 U.S. 389, 403-12 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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We call that action reasonable which an informed, intelligent, justminded,
civilized man could rationally favor. In passing upon legislation assailed
under the equality clause we have declared that the classification must rest
upon a difference which is real, as distinguished from one which is seeming,
specious, or fanciful, so that all actually situated similarly will be treated
alike, that the object of the classification must be the accomplishment of a
purpose or the promotion of a policy, which is within the permissible
functions of the state, and that the difference must bear a relation to the
object of the legislation which is substantial,
as distinguished from one
76
negligible.
or
remote,
speculative,
which is
The idea of the "informed, intelligent, justminded, civilized man" is
basic in Brandeis's thinking, we know. His opinion in Whitney v.
77
California,
decided just the year before Quaker City Cab, famously
grounded constitutional protection of free speech as a programmatic effort to
foster a clear thinking democratic politics supplanting popular prejudice-a
politics of "courageous, selfreliant men, with confidence in the power of free
and fearless reasoning applied through processes of popular government...
,,78 The initial sentence in Quaker City Cab listing preconditions of
reasonableness, it appears, is of a piece with Whitney, identifying
circumstances-if holding fully-in which Bradley's worries about "[t]he
76. Id. at 406 (citing Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890)).
77. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
78. Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). "Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears." Id. at 376. The idea that
freedom of speech is a governmental regime regulating democratic politics is, of course, the
organizing theme of the central paragraph of the Brandeis opinion in Whitney:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to
make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a
means.... They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;.
• . that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be the fundamental
principle of the American government.
Id. at 375. On this and surrounding passages in Whitney as evocative of a theory of both free
speech and more generally self-government, see Vincent Blasi, The FirstAmendment and the
Idea of Civil Courange: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 653 (1988). Professor Blasi identifies the trace here of Brandeis's admiration of the

political culture of classical Athens, see id. at 680-82; see also MICHEL FOUCAtJLT, THE
GOVERNMENT OF SELF AND OTHERS 154-59 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Graham Burchell trans.,
Palgrove Macmillan 2010) (2008) (discussing Greek conception ofparresia).
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war of race" in particular and "hostile discriminations" in general would be
manifestly absent.79 The real difference inquiry takes place within this
context, fixed by these thresholds.
Quaker City Cab itself struck Brandeis as an easy case. The tax there
distinguished between corporate and natural persons. "The difference
between a business carried on in corporate form and the same business
carried on by natural persons is, of course, a real and important one."80
Tellingly, he thought, "Congress has repeatedly discriminated against
incorporated concerns and in favor of the unincorporated." 8' But what if the
applicability of the premise of clear thinking were in doubt, if the possibility
of "hostile discrimination" were not so obviously beside the point? It is not
difficult to suppose that the real difference inquiry-Brandeis's versionmight then provide the point of departure for a harder look, a closer check as
reassurance. The Quaker City Cab formulation appears to recognize the
possibility of considerable rigor, developing a threefold elaboration, at hand
(it seems) for testing the bona fides of defenses of reasonableness in harder
cases. Brandeis, we may think, suggests a line of thinking that bears some
resemblance to Justice Stone's famous "footnote four" effort a decade later,
in United States v. CaroleneProducts Co. 82 Indeed, law clerk Louis Lusky,
in his first draft of Stone's footnote, wrote in startlingly direct Brandeisian
terms, sharply distinguishing "unreasoning" from "rational" political
processes (terms also evocative of Justice Bradley's "war of race"):
It may be too that when a statute is directed at a religious,..,
. or a racial minority .... the usual corrective processes will
an intolerable extent by unreasoning prejudice on the part
which cannot be expected to yield to rational argument

at a national,..
be hampered to
of the majority
in the political

form. 3

79. Indeed, the Whitney opinion, at the point that Brandeis acknowledges the limit of his
own analysis, seems to recall Bradley in Cruikshank, concerned to defend federal intervention
(and to limit it) given racial civil war: "[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
Only an emergency can justify repression."
before there is opportunity for full discussion ....
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
80. Quaker City Cab, 277 U.S. at 406.
81. Id. at 407. The focus on familiar legal usage is not dissimilar from Justice Jackson's
approach in Railway Express, see supra text accompanying notes 64-65, or Justice Kennedy's
analysis in Romer, see supra note 73.
82. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
83. Louis LUSKY, Appendix, in OUR NINE TRIBUNES 185 (1993). Justice Stone replaced
the last part, in his own initial draft, with a more subdued formula: "The special conditions
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It is not a long step from Justice Brandeis's dissent in Quaker City Cab
to Judge Cope's Florida analysis. It is also not difficult to recall the Cope
opinion's concluding quotation from Ostendorf: "The reason for the equal
protection clause was to assure that there would be no second class
citizens. ' 84 This sentence in one respect appears out of nowhere. We are in
position now, however, to recognize its own Reconstruction overtone, its
reiteration of a proposition Justice Bradley and his contemporaries would
have treated as a familiar recourse and point of departure in their own
controversies. 85 We may want to think of the Ostendorf quotation as a
carefully tactful response to (and an acknowledgement of) concern prompted
by the Anita Bryant-fueled frenzy that set the scene, we may remember,
within which the Florida adoption exclusion had become law. 86 Cope's close
look acquires basis. It is not as though the adroitly pitched homophobic
Bryant campaign is itself somehow the decisive constitutional fact-itself
decisive, the reason for the adoption exclusion's invalidation. 87 Rather, it
becomes a reason for threshold concern on Brandeis's model, a reason to
look for countering reassurance more closely than might otherwise have been
the case, via the "real difference" inquiry in any event already generally
pertinent.

obtaining in such situations, which tend seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes which are normally exerted to protect minorities may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial scrutiny." Id. at 186. Lusky in turn responded, adding an introductory
phrase to Stone' sentence, in effect defining "special conditions," but still a weaker version of
his own first try: "Prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a [The] ...... Id.
84. Ostendorfv. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 545-46 (Fla. 1982).
85. We might also recall the first sentence of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer, and
its evocation of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: "One century ago, the first
Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution 'neither know nor tolerates classes
among its citizens."' Romer, 517 U.S. at 623, quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. For a careful and detailed recounting in 2005, prominently and provocatively
retrieving Anita Bryant and her campaign on the high church occasion of a Dunwody Lecture
at the University of Florida, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas
and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1014-18, 1020-24,
1058-61 (2005).
87. Judge Barkett, dissenting in the Lofton 1I en banc decision, dwelt at length on both
the Bryant campaign and its echoes in the Florida Legislature, seeing these goings-on as joint
evidence of unconstitutional animus under Romer. See Lofton 11, 377 F.3d 1275, 1301-03
(11 th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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IV.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TEMPLATE

(I)

Neither Judge Lederman nor Judge Cope worries at all about whether to
model Florida constitutional law on its federal counterpart. Lederman treats
the pertinent Florida and federal law as interchangeable. Cope reads Florida
law as already well-settled by the state supreme court, as though whatever
hard choices there might be had already been made. We know-and we
know that Judges Lederman and Cope knew-that the adoption exclusion
question need not be thought of as easy. The Eleventh Circuit Lofton
opinions together had already established this much-even if not much else.
Both of the Florida opinions are in fact creative efforts.
I have largely ignored the most thought-provoking aspects of Judge
Lederman's work. She demands, in effect, that her readers treat as central the
rigorously-presented record of expert testimony and stipulations. In this way,
she not so implicitly depicts the constitutional question as first and foremost
a question of fact, as resolving the case in advance (as it were) of any
controversies with regard to choice of constitutional formulas. And she
inserts, right before her brief constitutional analysis per se, an extended,
daringly free-standing demonstration of the irreconcilable conflict between
legislative rejection of the idea of gay adoptive parents and the surrounding
statutory scheme and its premises. Again, as in her presentation of the record,
Lederman plainly fixes a perspective within which the exclusion appears to
to her readers the
be simply pointless-and in this instance again leaving
88
work, whether easy or hard, of identifying apt analytics.
If Judge Cope's work is more pertinent here, it is because he is, in
contrast, very much interested in fixing the framework, and therefore
establishing in particular that careful reading of the record in the case is
indeed appropriate. To this end, his opinion presents itself as an easy-toaccept accumulation of Florida constitutional commonplaces. As we have
seen, however, the juxtaposed Florida Supreme Court opinions translate
Cope's own discussion into a wider context, within which alternate state
judicial formulations appear to be no longer so straightforwardly
equivalent-and in which, more surprisingly, what we begin thinking is
Florida constitutional law increasingly appears to be a taking over of federal
law. The federal law is not, it is clear, the current state of the art. But it is, we
can see, distinctively federal, caught up in the great, widely known
controversies of the first third or so of the twentieth century. Matters in
88. In a work in progress I suggest that Judge Lederman's statutory discussion is
especially significant if set within a somewhat remodeled account of federal equal protection
analysis.
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question indeed run further back, well into the nineteenth century, back to
Fourteenth Amendment readings easy to link to initial Reconstruction, and
thus quintessential federal concerns. It is only in this wider and longer
unfolding, we realize, that the "real difference" terminology that Judge Cope
puts to work so persuasively in his opinion finds its needed distinctive
footing. Justices Brandeis and Bradley become his colleagues.
There is, of course, nothing necessarily remarkable about a state court
deciding a case at hand to choose "to rely on federal precedents as it would
on the precedents of all other jurisdictions," insofar as "the federal cases are
being used only for the purpose of guidance." 89 But here we meet something
different. Judge Cope's opinion-the point of focus for present purposesrefers immediately only to other Florida judicial opinions, but these
references in turn are part of a larger set of decisions framing state
constitutional law through use of a term that appears to originate in federal
constitutional law, even if not in recent judicial interpretation. In addition,
the term in question-"real difference"-appears to acquire at least a part of
its force (I argue anyway) from the distinctive setting in which the pertinent
federal constitutional provision was initially a response. This is not,
therefore, a circumstance we would associate with a constitutional law
equivalent of "general common law"-state and federal judges are not
independently selecting from (or adding to) some common stock of ideas in a
real sense separate from or anterior to the law of any given regime, subject
only to modifications necessary to fit the common ideas within jurisdiction
idiosyncrasies. It is also not straightforwardly state law, autonomously
responding to particulars of state history and politics, for example.
No intermediate body of constitutional choice of law emerges, of the sort
that Professor Williams criticized as difficult to situate or justify. Why would
state judges, if they take matters seriously, put to work within state
constitutional law terms associated with older federal law strongly shaped by
distinctively federal constitutional contexts? Writing forty years ago, in his
tour de force critique of substantive due process notions showing up in
Oregon decisions, Hans Linde declared: "In practice, courts and opposing
counsel should scrutinize any 'due process' citation earlier than volume 300
of the United States Reports with extreme skepticism." 9 Why shouldn't
something like the same stricture apply in Florida in 2010, in state judicial
opinions borrowing federal equal protection vocabulary? To be sure, in the
Oregon cases that prompted Linde, the state courts appeared to be applying
89. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
90. Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process": UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon,49 OR. L.
REV. 125, 185 (1970). In the same article, Professor Linde characterizes state judicial practice
as relying on "an episodic aberration of the distant past." Id. at 164.
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federal law as such-and Linde supposed, as the United States Supreme
Court pronounced a few years later in Oregon v. Hass91 and reiterated
subsequently: "[W]hen a state court reviews state legislation challenged as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not free to impose greater
restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law than this Court has
imposed. 9 2 In Florida, of course, the "matter" is formally a matter of state
constitutional law. The United States Supreme Court concedes: "A state
court may, of course, apply a more stringent standard of review as a matter
of state law under the State's equivalent to the Equal Protection . . .
Clause[]. 93 But in Florida the "more stringent standard of review" is
genetically federal (as it were) even as it is also "a matter of state law."
This is too abstract.
One answer at least may come into view by way of considering another
anomalous usage found in Florida constitutional opinions. Judges often refer
to "the Florida equal protection clause." 94 There is literally no such clause.
Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution provides: "All natural persons,
female and male alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights..
S.,9 This provision, although amended, is at bottom a 1968 composite,
combining the 1868 Reconstruction constitution's emphasis on equal persons
and inalienable rights (obviously borrowing from the Declaration of
Independence) and the 1885 replacement constitution's substitution of the
96
seemingly more substantively agnostic "equal before the law" language.
Like its predecessors, the 1968 constitutional language plainly does not
include the key Fourteenth Amendment phrase "protection of the law." Why
would state judges insist that they are in the business, as a matter of state
constitutional law, of elaborating and enforcing "equal protection of97 the
laws" if that requirement is distinctive to the United States Constitution?
"Equal protection of the laws" is an obligation that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes on state governments in the second sentence of section
one-following the first sentence dictate that all state residents are equally
91. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
92. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981) (citing Hass,
420 U.S. at 719).
93. id.
94. E.g., Schreiner v. McKenzie TankLines, Inc., 432 So. 2d 567, 569 (Fla. 1983).
95. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
96. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Florida Constitutional Theory (For Clifford Alloway), 48
U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 889-93 (1994).
97. The phenomenon is not unique to Florida. Robert Williams shows in considerable
detail that state courts all over the United States tie-or purport to tie-state constitutional law
to federal equal protection thinking notwithstanding manifest differences in state and federal
constitutional texts. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 216-24.
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state citizens (if they are United States citizens). Against the backdrop of the
initial post-Civil War crisis-Black Codes in essence racially differentiating
categories of status and citizenship, emergent insurgent terrorism directed
against former slaves and their allies, etc.-it is hardly surprising that the
Fourteenth Amendment, the principle constitutional response to the crisis,
incorporated a federal definition of state citizenship and specified the
governmental duty to protect ordinarily supposed to be owed to citizens, or
indeed all residents in most respects. 98 State governments were thus
identified, as a matter of federal constitutional law, as potentially both
problems and solutions, potentially incompletely organized and subject to
seizure by private, sometimes violent or otherwise illegal agendas. 99 State
officials therefore assumed a federal obligation in their ordinary course of
work to show their acknowledgement of federal responsibilities. This is not a
matter, we all know, that is simply a passage in nineteenth century
constitutional history. Mid-twentieth century resistance to Brown v. Board of
Education is only one especially obvious later parallel. 1° We all remember
decisions like Cooper v. Aaron and Walker v. Birmingham and their
attendant complexities. 101
In Florida, opposition to Brown, among its multiple forms, included a
prominent judicial involvement, the result of repeated pronouncements by
Glenn Terrell, a brilliant and widely popular "log cabin Florida" throwback,
chief justice of the Florida Supreme Court through some of the period, an
insistent and provocative defender of racial segregation and sharp critic of
the United States Supreme Court. 0 2 Merely wary in 1954,103 Terrell had by

98. For pertinent precursors, see, for example, Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y. Gen. 382, 388
(1862); Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 6-7, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), reprintedin
3 PHILIP B. KURLAND & GERHARD CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 184-85 (1978). See also 2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMNETARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 654 (4th

ed.

1873) (notes and additions by Thomas M. Cooley).
99. See infra pp. 958-60, 962-64.
100. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 385-442 (2004).
101. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Emergency, Legality, Sovereignty: Birmingham, 1963, in
SOVEREIGNTY, EMERGENCY, LEGALITY 72-119 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).

102. On Justice Terrell as cult figure, see Susan Yancey, 'The People's Judge',33 FLA.
B.J. 1138 (1959) (high school senior's winning essay in Florida Historical Society contest) and
THE JUDICIAL SAYINGS OF JUSTICE GLENN TERRELL (M. Lewis Hall ed., 1964). Regarding

Terrell's opposition to Brown v. Board of Education, see, for example, id. at 137-39, and
Glenn Terrell, States 'Rights-The Law of the Land, 32 FLA. B.J. 458 (1958) (book review).
103. Writing for a unanimous Florida Supreme Court in 1954, upholding school bonds
issued to fund construction of segregated schools, Justice Terrell concluded that Brown by
itself did not dramatically change circumstances:
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1957, in the famous in Florida case State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of
Control, crossed over, in passages writing in ways that, while carefully
avoiding direct confrontation, not so subtly suggested grounds for outright
opposition to Brown, in terms now startling and disturbing:
Some anthropologists and historians much better informed than I am
point out that segregation is as old as the hills. The Egyptians practiced it on
the Israelites; the Greeks did likewise for the barbarians; the Romans
segregated the Syrians; the Chinese segregated all foreigners; segregation is
said to have produced the caste system in India and Hitler practiced it in his
Germany, but no one ever discovered that it was in violation of due process
until recently and to do so some of the same historians point out that the
Supreme Court abandoned the Constitution, precedent and common sense
and fortified its decision solely with the writings of Gunner Myrdal, a
about constitutional law we are not
Scandinavian sociologist. What he knew
10 4
learn.
to
able
been
we
have
nor
told
Hitler as precedent?
Such is in part the predicate on which the states are resisting integration.
They contend that since the Supreme Court has tortured the Constitution, ...
they have a right to torture the court's decision. Whatever substance there
may be to this contention, it is certain that forced integration is not the
answer to the question. It is a challenge to freedom of action that is contrary
to every democratic precept. It is certain that attempts at integration by court
order have engendered more strife, tension, hatred and disorder than can be
compensated for in generations of attempt on the part of those who are
forward looking and want to do so. They have done more to break down

The moral attitude of the white population in the affected states will have infinitely
more to do with correcting the alleged vices of segregation than any court decision.

At least one-fourth of the population of the country is involved, and it is utter folly to
contend that desegregation or any other new and untried philosophy will taken root
and grow before a sympathetic feeling for it is established. Intangible barriers
dissolve under sympathetic understanding and trained leadership much more readily

than they do under court orders.
Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. State, 75 So.2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1954).

104.

State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 93 So.2d 354, 360-61 (Fla. 1957)

(Terrell, C.J., concurring). In a similar vein, see Glenn Terrell, Book Review, 32
(July, 1958).

FLA.

B.J. 458
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progress and destroy good feeling and understanding between the races than
anything that has taken place since emancipation. 105
It is therefore not surprising, indeed in an important sense precisely
appropriate, if Florida judges later on appear to take seriously
acknowledgements of federal obligations as integral elements in state
lawmaking, including constitutional drafting and interpretation. I do not
mean to posit some sort of radical conversion circa 1968-some mass shift
by Florida judges and lawyers away from resistance to segregation towards
support of the civil rights movement. Anders Walker has stressed the
complexity of the political landscape in states like Florida in the post-Brown
era, in which civil rights supporters and ardent "massive resistance" racial
segregationists collided not only with each other, but with determined
"moderates" for much of the period aimed at preserving as much racial
segregation as possible, but also committed precisely not to break with
federal law, to identify and pursue opportunities that the United States
Supreme Court and federal officials afforded for slowing change, and to
monitor and control closely both civil rights workers and segregationist
extremists. 10 6 The "moderate" impulse, it is easy to suggest, might readily
carry forward into the post-segregation era, with acknowledgement of federal
law now becoming a ready resource or setting for state judicial or other
official action, along the way relegating figures like Glenn Terrell to the
margins, to an increasingly "prior" legal culture. The repeated references to
"the Florida equal protection clause" might be one manifestation. The deeper
willingness to appropriate federal understandings of "the equal protection of
the laws" to inform the elaboration of state constitutional criteria would seem
to be of a piece. This is especially fitting, we might think, within the context
of judicial review of the statutory preclusion of adoption by homosexual
couples, Florida law enacted within an antagonized political environment too
07
redolent of Reconstruction worry.1

V. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TEMPLATE (II)
As readers of Robert Williams, what should we make of all this?

105.
106.

Hawkins, 93 So.2d at 36 1.

ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009). On circumstances in Florida,

see id. at 85-116.
107. See supra note 86.
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I have been arguing against the main current of contemporary writing
about state constitutional law that Professor Williams's book shows off in
one of its highest and best forms. "State constitutional law" is-or is
depicted as-an entirely general phenomenon, either truly nationwide or
nearly so in important parts of its content, or in any case considered
comparatively, with developments in particular states ordinarily explored
vis-a-vis each other. But there is still much to be learned, I think, from
"parochial, state-specific" study. 10 8 Important movements of ideas at work
within constitutional law sometimes become apparent only given close
attention to genealogy, or recurring instabilities, or the possibility of periods
of crisis, no doubt all inter alia. This requires, almost always, close attention
to particular places and times, cases and controversies. As here, moreover,
we may want to think about both state and federal constitutional law, and we
need therefore to consider the roles each may play within the development of
the other, a double renvoi that is an exercise now twice "parochial." I have
also tried, however, to respond to Robert Williams's critique-his own
unease in view of the unease that state constitutional law, considered
generally, exhibits regarding the idea of independent, autonomous rights
jurisprudence. If noticing Justices Brandeis and Bradley-their distinctive
efforts-adds anything, it is because their formulations and the historical
moments in the process addressed and expressed somehow evoke pressing
constitutional inquiries in other, later particular settings. This is a peculiar
sort of action at a distance, we might think. Conjunctions of ideas formed at
different points in time within one constitutional regime are understood as
formative within still another context and time, within another regime as
well.
If it is not simply an oddity, this trajectory, or rather, the possibility of
this trajectory, needs accounting, a way of tracing its vector. Consider,
therefore, this too summary gloss:
The Fourteenth Amendment reacts to-is mustered into-an already
present post-Civil War war, an insurgent reassertion of a status quo ante
9
absent only the full formal trappings of chattel slavery. 0 Doubt about the

108.

WILLIAMS, supra note

1, at 8.

PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 16-20 (1999);
HEATHER Cox RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION 16-20 (2001). On Black Codes
and related legal manifestations, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED

109.

See

199-210 (1988). The charge that the Committee of Fifteen (the joint
congressional committee responsible for drafting the Fourteenth Amendment) gave to its
investigative subcommittees tersely summarizes framer concerns at the outset:
[S]ub-committees ... [shall] be appointed to examine and report upon the present
condition of the States composing the late so-called Confederate States of America..
REVOLUTION
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bona fides of the agendas of state-selected officials becomes the
Amendment's overarching theme-in three particulars tied precisely to
continuities in policies that might be pursued by officials associated with the
former Confederacy,1 10 but also more generally, expressed in terms
reiterating the risks that officials would ignore commitments owing to
populations: their status as equally citizens of the United States and therefore
equally state citizens; the concomitants of national citizenship; their claims
to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. Eric Foner writes:
"The Fourteenth Amendment can only be understood as a whole . . .
interven[ing] directly in Southern politics, seeking to conjure into being a
new political leadership that would respect the principle of equality before
the law." '' However immediate and limited in time and place the initial
constitutional program, we can see, its worries are addressed in substantial
part in ways that formally generalize and extend forward in time the
Amendment's originating preoccupations. The initial accumulation of
concerns is in itself remarkable; it inserts into the Constitution a recurring,
complex suspicion as to the allegiance of state-selected officials and
therefore a recurring question as well about the propriety of state
government. This departure from usual notions of comity and relative
institutional autonomy characteristic of American federalism is both sharp
and still part of ordinary constitutional
law: the Fourteenth Amendment is
12
different., we are quite sure'
•what may be the present legal position of the freedmen in the respective States; in
what manner the so-called ordinances of secession have been treated; whether the
validity of debts contracted for the support of the rebellion is acknowledged; and
generally as to all evidence, documentary or otherwise, of the present loyalty or
disloyalty upon the part of the people or government of said states.
BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 47 (1914) (committee action dating from January 12, 1866).
It is altogether plausible to argue, moreover, that the proposal and installation of the
Fourteenth Amendment in important ways sharpens this politics in the very process of
confronting it. For the classic account, see MICHAEL PERMAN, REUNION WITHOUT
COMPROMISE 234-65, 337-47 (1973).
110. The second, third, and fourth sections reduced allocated seats in Congress if (as
expected) legislatures in formerly Confederate states denied black citizens suffrage; denied
opportunity for federal or state office to individuals who were officially active in Confederate
government and had previously taken oaths to support the United States Constitution; and
barred payment of Confederate debt.
111. FONER, supra note 109, at 259.
112. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . themselves embody significant limitations on state
authority."); accord, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158-59 (2006); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).
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For purposes of thinking about the content of state constitutional law,
uses of the Fourteenth Amendment and its originating, Reconstructionworried context require a template, a sufficient sense of concomitants.
Propositions Chief Justice Chase marched across Texas v. White" 3 meet this
need, I think-in sum an analytical history, written at the height of
Reconstruction commitment, work of one of the most-accomplished legal
and political figures of the time, declaring constitutional premises easily
associated with the text of the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 Not often
studied,115 Chase's formulations warrant quoting at length:
The people, in whatever territory dwelling, either temporarily or
permanently, and whether organized under a regular government, or united
by looser and less definite relations, constitute the state.' 16
[T]he principal sense of the word seems to be that primary one to which we
have adverted, of a people or political community, as distinguished from a
government.
[A] plain distinction is made between a State and the government of a
State.

17

. . . [T]he preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as
the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National
government. The Constitution, in all of its provisions, looks to an
118
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.
The obligations of allegiance to the State, and of obedience to her laws,
subject to the Constitution of the United States, are binding upon all citizens,
whether faithful or unfaithful to them; but the relations which subsist while
...

113.

74 U.S. 700 (1868). For opposing assumptions, see id at 737-41 (Grier, J.,

dissenting).

114. Because White involved matters in part preceding adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment Chief Justice Chase framed his discussion in constitutionally quite general terms.
115. But see Charlton C. Copeland, Ex Parte Young: Sovereignty, Immunity, and the
ConstitutionalStructure ofAmerican Federalism,40 U. TOL. L. REV. 843, 867-72 (2009).
116. White, 74 U.S. at 720.
117. Id.at721.
118. ld.at725.
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these obligations are performed, are essentially different from those which
arise when they are disregarded and set at nought. And the same must
necessarily be true of the obligations and relations of States and citizens to
the Union .... All admit that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of
the State as a member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were
suspended. The government and the citizens of the State, refusing to
the character of enemies,
recognize their constitutional obligations, assumed
19
and incurred the consequences of rebellion. 1
The new freemen necessarily became part of the people, and the people still
constituted the State; for States, like individuals, retain their identity, though
changed to some extent in their constituent elements. And it was the State,
thus constituted, which was now entitled to the benefit of the constitutional
120
guaranty.
... But the restoration of the government which existed before the rebellion,
without a new election of officers, was obviously impossible; and before any
such election could be properly held, it was necessary that the old
constitution should receive such amendments as would conform its
provisions to the new conditions created by emancipation, and afford
adequate security to the people of the State. 12'
Government of the people, by the people, for the people? Chief Justice
Chase understands "the people of the State" to be sovereign-"constitutethe
State"-but to be also at times a threat-"refusing to recognize their
constitutional obligations, assum[ing] the character of enemies."
Constitutional obligations? If its people define a state-and not the state's
governing institutions, processes, and office-holders-it is the populace
therefore who owe each other (together the state) duties of allegiance.
Because a state is at bottom simply a population, it is easy to understandall
persons resident as undifferentiated, equally sovereign, to be treated
therefore as equals. "The new freemen necessarily became part of the
people, and the people . . . constituted the State . . . ." It is this inclusion,
fundamentally, that gives rise "to the new conditions created by
emancipation" dictating constitutional "amendments as would conform its
provisions."
Why? "Adequate security to the people of the State"-protection given
allegiance-is within Chase's vocabulary the same thing as tying together
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 727.
Id. at 728-29.
Id. at 729.
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"the preservation of the States" and "the maintenance of their governments."
The States are the people of the States-the implication follows therefore
that "the preservation of the [people]" must be in some sense chronically at
risk: the point of constitutional adjustment becomes "[a]dequate security." At
risk from whom? Again, it must be people of the State themselves, at war
against other members of the same populace, in "rebellion," in breach of the
duties of allegiance they owe each other: civil war. This is a matter of
concern to the federal government as well as state governments. Chase need
not pause to elaborate his logic: State citizens are at the same time federal
citizens, "the people of the [United States]" equally "constitute the [United
States]. 122 Chase's propositions, we can therefore see, subsume matters in
dispute in 1868 within conclusions established or confirmed by the Civil
War-and also map readily onto all or almost all of the particulars of the five
sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointedly, within the states, "the
maintenance of their governments" acquires a distinctive constitutional
framing. Governments appear as not themselves sovereign, rather simply
instruments, in play across competing contingencies, resources of authority
("color of law") or force or other means, in either civil war contesting the
equal status of the populace across the board or alternatively projects
precisely grounded in conceptions of general good or equal
acknowledgement. Testing the pertinence of these opposed possibilities visA-vis each other becomes the Fourteenth Amendment task in chief, and as a
result, the concern of both the federal government and constitutionallyresponsible state officials themselves.
I read Chief Justice Chase, therefore, as engineering a repeating,
cumulating underscoring of precariousness: depicting state governments and
the federal government as simply mechanisms, creatures of populationsand then recognizing popular sovereignty, which ought to become the
foundation of political authority, as itself faulted and fragile, always at risk
of fracture-civil war. "Democracy and distrust," indeed! Chase's complex
of alternatives and interplays describes precisely not a "machine that would
go of itself," rather a sometimes nightmarish constitutional Calder mobile,
which through its movements, among its possible delineations, maps
occasions of crisis, therefore revealing to persons perceiving the mobile's
play reason for unease, and senses of foreboding and urgency. Chase's
construction, we might think, "agitate[s] the law from within, to something

122.
It follows just as readily, again given the twice-fundamentality of the people, who
constitute both the States and the United States, that "the maintenance of' federal government
also might become part of the business of state governments.
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like a chronic state of emergency within the domain of law itself."' 123 But it
also includes within its range of movements a second possibility, of
constitutional provisions positioning as off-sets: as governing forms warding
off or countering risks of crisis the overall interplay may bring to attention.
Much in the Fourteenth Amendment, we easily see, might be thought of in
this way, as a post-bellum "anti-emergency constitution."124 For example,

section one takes out of fracturing political debate the question of
citizenship, mandating equal citizenship; obliges state officials and
governments to respect federally-granted privileges and immunities across
the board; and maintain legal regimes within which even-handed
commitments
to principles of due process and equal protection are
25
apparent. 1
It is not hard to glimpse Chief Justice Chase's template in the
background at points in Justice Bradley's formulations - in his sense of crisis
and urgency in Cruikshank occasioned by the possibility of the "war of
race," and reset later within purportedly ordinary parameters of equal
protection inquiry. Chase's possibilities remain evident in Justice Brandeis's
equal protection synthesis in Quaker City Cab. The markers of concern are
pretty much the same. It is only another short step, we have already seen, to
Judge Cope's use of the "real difference" rubric in Florida in 2010.

123.

ERIc L. SANTNER, THE ROYAL REMAINS: THE PEOPLE'S Two BODIES AND THE

ENDGAMES OF SOVEREIGNTY 9 (2011) (characterizing Michel Foucault account).

124. See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004).
125. Charlton Copeland puts Texas v. White to work somewhat differently:
[T]he national government must respect the status of the states in the federal system,
and the states must respect the status of the national government. Respect for the
perpetual nature of the federal relationship obligates the states to remain committed to
their connection with the national government. Similarly, national respect for the
states requires that the national government recognizes state independence, whose
legitimacy is derived from the states' status as separate political communities in the
federal system, even as constitutional obligations remain binding on state and
national actors alike.
Copeland, supra note 115, at 874. In this article and in forthcoming work, Copeland works out
a "relational conception of federalism" within which "[t]he Constitution's supremacy" is
recognized simultaneously with respect for "the status of both the state and federal
governments as distinct political communities." Id. at 873. He sees this triune conjunctionJohn Donne's "Batter my heart, three-person'd God"-as delineated in conceptions of
"political community, the authority of which is measured by its accountability to the people,"
protected the Constitution. Id. at 874. My account, it should be obvious, is less magisterial and
triumphal.
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This easy progression should not mislead, however. Not all invocations
of the Fourteenth Amendment-or the Equal Protection Clause in
particular-match up. Consider, for example, the California constitutional
amendment at issue in Crawfordv. Board of Education:
[N]othing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon
the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligations
or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection
Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to the United States Constitution
with respect to the use of public school assignment or pupil transportation. In
enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no
court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public
entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the
use of public school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy
a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal
decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to
remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection2 6 Clause of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment of the United States Constitution.'
The United States Supreme Court, addressing a federal challenge to the
amendment, treated the case as confounding: "It would be paradoxical to
conclude that by adopting the Equal Protection Clause of2 7the Fourteenth
it.'
Amendment, the voters of the State thereby had violated
Viewed as state constitutional law, however, as a lockstep mechanism of
the sort that Robert Williams catalogues, the California provision becomes
not only analyzable, but importantly more provocative than the federal
Supreme Court apparently understood it to be. The amendment is not simply
a cross-reference or citation to the Fourteenth Amendment. It is also
designedly a response to and revision of prior California constitutional law.
In this instance, the constitutional change is not only (maybe not even
primarily) substantive: it is also institutional or structural. The keys are the
instructions directly addressed to "court[s] of this state," even more so the
repeated references to "any public entity, board, or official," and to "any
obligation or responsibility."

126.
127.

Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 532 n.6 (1982).
Id. at 535.

RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 41:931

In 1976 in the course of the Crawford litigation itself,1 28 the California
29
Supreme Court, expanding on its Jackson decision over a decade earlier,
declared that "school boards in this state bear a constitutional obligation to
attempt to alleviate school segregation, regardless of its cause."1' 30 The
Crawford opinion characterized this duty broadly, reflecting its skepticism
regarding the usefulness of the distinction between de jure and de facto
school segregation prominent in federal law. But the California Crawford
decision departed from federal practice in a second important way.
Responsibility was primarily administrative-state courts were to defer to
school boards: "[S]o long as a local school board initiates and implements
reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation in its district, and so
long as such steps produce meaningful progress .

.

. we do not believe the

judiciary should intervene... .131
The constitutional amendment drafted in response to the state Crawford
opinion, substituting "federal court" understanding of Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection requirements, not only transplanted substantive
federal law-notably, the de jure/de facto distinction called into question by
the California Supreme Court-it also executed an institutional
transformation, shifting primary jurisdiction from school boards to courts. To
be sure, the amendment directly addresses state courts, instructing them to
mimic federal courts. But because the California Supreme Court had
previously put in place a version of administrative law, a regime
acknowledging substantial discretion on the part of school boards, the new
constitutional command requiring conformity to federal judicial practice, a
regime of close judicial supervision itself closely regulated, was
institutionally transformative. School boards were no longer to act as though
independent, as possessed of respected discretion. They were instead to take
cues from courts with regard to both impetus ("specific violation") and
remedy, a mimicry all the more artificial and thus confining because the
model courts would ultimately be federal rather than state.
The Crawford amendment thus was precisely an act in opposition-we
might think today-to "federalism all the way down," Heather Gerken's
eloquent description and defense of institutional plurality and de-emphasized
sovereignty, within states as well as across, multiplying opportunities for
groups and views figuring as minorities in larger settings to take hold in

128.
129.

Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963).

130.
131.

Crawford,551 P.2d at 36; Jackson, 382 P.2d at 882.
Crawford,551 P.2d at 45.
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narrower contexts. 13 2 The inclusion of explicitly federal law inside state law

worked to limit debate as a matter of California politics, leaving officials and
constituents alike in the role of passive spectators, watching and waiting for
the outcomes of federal judicial contests. Equally clear, the amendment's use
of federal law-unlike, say, Judge Cope's in Florida-does not fit well with
the Texas v. White template. The federal transplant's initial invocation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause might be taken to be a
Reconstruction-like pledge of allegiance. The subsequent passages-plainly
drafted to be functionally central-nonetheless mark institutional
arrangements as primary, decisively rearranging the relationship of
California judicial and administrative regimes by training the California
courts to federal judicial practice. It is not at all easy, as a result, to read the
wholesale incorporation of federal judicial assessment of the equal protection
implications of "school assignment and pupil transportation"-remedial
procedures included-as addressing in any clear way Chief Justice Chase's
concern that popular sovereignty might be at the same time fundamental
constitutionally and fundamentally divisive.
The institutional politics that the language of the Crawford amendment
reveals-read against the background of the California Supreme Court's
work-suggests, rather, that treating the amendment as an expression of
equal protection fealty is too simple. The question of why federal law should
be put to work within state law in this unusual way in this particular setting
may be readily regarded as more troubling than the United States Supreme
Court treated it in 1982. Crawford, indeed, precisely raises Justice Bradley's
worry about the conjunction of the legally "unusual" and constitutionally
up to date terms, Crawford
suspect "hostility - or, to put the point in more 133
may look to us as a lot like Romer before Romer.

The larger question remains: Why should we regard the Texas v. White
template as salient, why should glimpses of its premises and preoccupations
in the work of state court judges (for example) add force to their arguments
or conclusions? In Crawford itself, this question was beside the point. The
lockstep formula there was a product of constitutional amendment and not
adjudicative choice, as in the cases Robert Williams discusses. 134 But in
circumstances in which alternative readings of state provisions are indeed
See generally Heather K. Gerken, FederalismAll the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
132.
REV. 4 (2010).
See supra p.948.
133.
See supra p. 936.
134.
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under consideration, the appeal of Fourteenth Amendment footing for
interpretations of state constitutional provisions is straightforward: the
"legitimacy questions"' 135 that Professor Williams suggests prompts judicial
reluctance surely diminish if state judges can link their work with federal
constitutional concerns.
The Texas v. White template may be only one among a larger set of
characterizations within which we might recognize alternative conceptions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Why prefer Chief Justice Chase's sense 136
of
Amendment?
Fourteenth
the
relevant
as
treat
to
opt
why
Indeed,
things?
Chase depicts a state of affairs in which (we have seen) government is
incompletely organized, at risk of becoming caught up in "civil wars,"
conflicts within the populace in which the premise of "equal citizenship" is
under assault as a matter of both fact and perception. This is, we might think,
a rather old-fashioned worry. But suppose we see recurrence of Bradley's
"war of race," in whatever contemporary form, as chronic-and maybe
especially if we see other modes of social division as also tending to mutate
forcefully (again, in whatever form), becoming assertions and impositions of
outright, persisting hierarchies? We might therefore want to attend to the
fragility of government, take note of its tendency to serve as an at-hand
mechanism, as a more or less readily adaptable project in the making. This is
distinctively Fourteenth Amendment work-as Chase (and Brandeis and
sometimes Bradley) understood it-and we can easily see versions of this
same concern implicit in the efforts of federal and state judges who are our
own contemporaries. The work, notably, is both profound and pointed,
strongly prompted and strongly limited simultaneously: apt in circumstances
in which Fourteenth Amendment "civil war" worries hold, circumstances
defined in Brandeis's map of reason and unreason, therefore only sometimes
salient, dormant in conditions otherwise. It is not so much therefore a matter
of co-existing or superseding characterizations-rather, really, a matter of
alternate constitutional universes.

135. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 185. Professor Williams's extended discussion is
important, challenging, and well-done. See id.at 137-85.
136. Professor Gerken's essay provocatively explores a version of this question at
length. See Gerken, supra note 132, at 48-59.

